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Judging Leaders Who Facilitate
Crimes by a Foreign Army:
International Courts Differ on a
Novel Legal Issue
Mugambi Jouet*

ABSTRACT

In one of the most significant cases in the history of
international criminal law,

Prosecutor

v.

Perigid,

the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) effectively addressed an issue of first impression: may a
military or political leader be convicted for knowingly
facilitating crimes by another state's army? The influential
tribunal answered this question in the negative-knowledge
that the recipients of military assistanceare perpetratingcrimes
is essentially irrelevant absent evidence that the facilitator
specifically intended that crimes occur. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber thus acquitted Serbian General Momilo Peridid, who
had been convicted at trial of knowingly aiding and abetting
atrocities by the Bosnian Serb army in Sarajevo and Srebrenica
between 1993 and 1995. The record suggests that certainjudges
were concerned that convicting individuals like Peridi6 could
potentially disrupt internationalrelations by casting too wide a
net for convicting leaders whose provision of military aid
facilitatescrimes by a foreign army.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone subsequently held that
the controversial Perigid precedent did not comport with
customary international law, and therefore affirmed the
conviction of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian President,for
knowingly assisting atrocities by rebel forces during the Sierra
Leone Civil War. In an even more striking development, a
different ICTY appellate panel thereafter reversed the Perigi6
legal standard on the ground that it neither comported with

* Former Associate Legal Officer (judicial clerk), U.N. International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The author drafted part of the Perigie trial
judgment. The present Article is based solely on information on the public record and
does not disclose any confidential material. The author expresses his gratitude to
Francesco Moneta for his helpful comments.
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ICTY jurisprudence nor customary international law. This
Article analyzes this historic turn of events and explores the
appropriate legal standard to convict leaders who enable
atrocities by a foreign army.
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I.INTRODUCTION
Two international courts have effectively addressed an issue of
first impression: whether military or political leaders may be
convicted for knowingly facilitating crimes by foreign armed forces
not under their direct control. Both the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL) examined this intricate question in the cases of
prominent defendants accused of aiding and abetting atrocitiesMom6ilo Perigi6, a Serbian General, and Charles Taylor, the former
Liberian President.

Prosecutor v. Perigiel and Prosecutor v. Taylor2 are among the
most significant cases in the history of international criminal law not
only because they raised novel legal issues, concerned mass atrocities,
and involved high-profile defendants. These cases also stand out
because both international courts impliedly, and at times overtly,
weighed how international relations could be affected by a precedent

1.
Prosecutor v. Perigid, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Perigid Appellate Judgment];
Prosecutor v. Perigid, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Perigik Trial Judgment].
2.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgement (Sept. 26, 2013)
[hereinafter Taylor Appellate Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01T, Judgement (May-18, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment].
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under which a top official is convicted for providing military
assistance to a foreign military force responsible for war crimes. Yet,
the courts initially reached vastly different conclusions.
In Perigie,the ICTY Appeals Chamber deemed that a facilitator's
knowledge that the recipients of military assistance are perpetrating
crimes is essentially irrelevant, absent proof that the facilitator's
actions were "specifically directed" to assist crimes 3-a requirement
tantamount to proof that the facilitator specifically intended the
crimes to occur. The Appeals Chamber consequently acquitted
General Perigid, who had been sentenced to twenty-seven years in
prison at trial for knowingly aiding and abetting crimes perpetrated
by the Bosnian Serb army against Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica during the Bosnian War (1992-95).4 General Periki6 was
responsible for managing Serbia's provision of considerable military
assistance to its Bosnian Serb allies during most of the war.5 The
ICTY Trial Chamber had found that General Perii had facilitated
the Bosnian Serb army's military operations despite knowing that
they encompassed systematic attacks on Muslim civilians. 6 The
Appeals Chamber nonetheless proceeded to acquit him on the ground
that the hitherto obscure element of "specific direction" was not
established, thereby significantly raising the legal standard to convict
a prominent official of knowingly facilitating atrocities. 7
Conversely, in Taylor, the SCSL explicitly refused to follow the
precedent set by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Peridi6 by
emphasizing that proof of "specific direction" is not required under
customary international law, as it is sufficient that the facilitator
provided substantial assistance with the knowledge that the recipient
armed forces were committing crimes.8 The SCSL hence affirmed the
conviction and fifty-year sentence of Charles Taylor, who had been
convicted at trial of aiding and abetting crimes by rebel forces in
Sierra Leone's civil war, which coerced child soldiers and murdered,

3.
See Perigi Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, 1 73-74 (requiring proof of
"acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to [crimes]").
4.
See id.
1815-17, 1820-22, 1840-41 (pronouncing the Trial Chamber's
verdict and sentence).
1007 (concluding that Periid "oversaw the
5.
See id. pt. VIB,
administration of logistical assistance for the military needs" of the VRS).
6.
See Perigi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 1, IT 1466-68, 1588-91, 1639-47
(finding that systematic attacks on civilians were "inextricably linked to the war
strategy and objectives of the VRS leadership").
7.
See Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1,
73-74 (reversing Perigi's
conviction on the ground that "specific direction" is an essential element of aiding and
abetting that was not conclusively established in this case).
See Taylor Appellate Judgment, supra note 2, 1 472-81, 486, 708 (holding
8.
that the Perigic appellate judgment "omitted any discussion of customary international law" and
advanced unreasonable "novel elements in its articulation of specific direction").
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raped, mutilated, and amputated civilians on a vast scale.9 Taylor
thus became the first former head of state convicted by a modern
international court.
In a striking turn of events, a different panel of judges on the
ICTY Appeals Chamber subsequently reversed the legal standard set
in Perigid less than a year earlier. That decision in Prosecutor v.
Sainovie et al.--otherwise known as the Milutinovi6 caselo-held that
the Perigid appellate judgment deviated from both ICTY
jurisprudence and customary international law. The Sainovi6 panel
therefore pointedly announced that it "unequivocally reject[ed]" the
Perigid standard since "specific direction" is not a requisite element of
aiding and abetting," thereby siding with the SCSL's holding in
Taylor.12 Given the extraordinary developments precipitated by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber's highly controversial decision in Perigid,this
Article will particularly focus on how this decision set an extremely
high legal standard to convict a top official for facilitating atrocities
from a remote location.
Commentary on the Appeals Chamber's contentious holding in
Peridid has focused on its legal reasoning, especially its decision to
deviate from prior jurisprudence and customary international law by
demanding proof of "specific direction."' 3 Far less attention has been

9.
See Taylor Appellate Judgment, supra note 2,
260, 280, 518-21
(discussing the Trial Chamber's findings regarding crimes against civilians and
Taylor's role therein).
10.
Prosecutor v. Sainovid, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgement, $ 1 & n.1 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Sainovi6 Appellate
Judgment]. This case involving multiple defendants is also commonly identified as the
Milutinovi6 case after Milan Milutinovid, who was acquitted at trial. The prosecution
did not challenge Milutinovid's acquittal on appeal. Id.
11.
See id. 1 1650 ("[T]he Appeals Chamber ... unequivocally rejects the
approach adopted in the Perigid Appeal Judgement as it is in direct and material
conflict with the prevailing jurisprudence on the actus reus of aiding and abetting
liability and with customary international law in this regard.").
12.
See id. 1 1649 nn.5430-31 (citing, inter alia, Taylor Appellate Judgment,
supra note 2, 11 436, 471-81).
13.
See, e.g., Manuel J. Ventura, Farewell 'Specific Direction: Aiding and
Abetting War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Perigid, Taylor, Sainovi6 et al.,
and US Alien Tort Statute Jurisprudence, in THE WAR REPORT: ARMED CONFLICT IN
2013 (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights ed.,
forthcoming Dec. 2014) (calling into question the legal reasoning of the Peridid
appellate judgment); Antonio Coco & Tom Gal, Losing Direction: The ICTY Appeals
Chamber's ControversialApproach to Aiding and Abetting in Perigi, 12 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 345 (2014) (criticizing the Perigid appellate judgment and arguing that it neither
comported with ICTY jurisprudence nor customary international law); Patrick W.
Hayden & Katerina I. Kappos, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International
Criminal Tribunals, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 899, 903-07 (2013) (calling into question
the Perigid appellate judgment); Christopher Jenks, Prosecutor v. Peri§id, 107 AM. J.
INT'L L. 622, 622-26 (2013) (same); Leila Nadya Sadat, Can the ICTY Sainovid and
Perriii Cases Be Reconciled?, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming July 2014) (calling into
question the legal reasoning of the Perigid appellate decision); Case Review: Special
Court for SierraLeone Rejects "Specific Direction"Requirement for Aiding and Abetting
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devoted to how the Appeals Chamber disregarded critical factual
evidence when holding that no "link" existed between General
Perigid's actions and war crimes. 14 As we will see, its judgment made
no reference to how the beleaguered Bosnian Serb army heavily
depended on Serbian support to conduct its operations, which
encompassed systematic attacks on civilians pursuant to an ethnic
cleansing plan.
Unlike General Perigid, who was technically accused of
supporting the army of a foreign state, the Bosnian Serb Republic
Violations of International Law-Prosecutor v. Taylor, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1847, 1847,
1854 (2014) (arguing that the SCSL properly rejected the "specific direction"
requirement set in Perigi6 since it did not comport with customary international law);
Christopher P. Eby, Comment, Aid "Specifically Directed" to Facilitate War Crimes:
The ICTY's Anomalous Actus Reus Standardfor Aiding and Abetting, 15 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 256, 267-68, 270-75, 278-86 (2014) (calling into question the Perigid appellate
judgment); Owen Bowcott, Hague War Crimes Ruling Threatens to Undermine Future
Prosecutions,THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2013, 13:55 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/
[http://perma.cc/A2HUlaw/2013/aug/13/hague-war-crimes-ruling-prosecutions-serb
TNGD] (archived Sept. 7, 2014) (describing the controversy over the Perigi6 legal
standard); Eric Gordy, What Happened to the Hague Tribunal?, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/opinion/global/what-happened-to-the-haguetribunal.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cclWFD6-MMJ9] (archived Sept. 7, 2014)
(criticizing the Perigid appellate judgment); Kenneth Roth, A Tribunal's Legal Stumble,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/globallatribunals-legal-stumble.html [http://perma.cc/NU3G-GMFZ] (archived Sept. 7, 2014)
(criticizing the Perigi6 appellate judgment); Marlise Simons, Court Overturns War
Crimes Conviction of Former Chief of Yugoslav Army, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/world/europe/court-overturns-war-crimes[http://perma.cc/TME2-362R]
conviction-of-former-chief-of-yugoslav-army.html?_r=1
(archived Sept. 7, 2014) (noting that experts were "baffled" by the Perigid appellate
judgment); James G. Stewart, "Specific Direction"is Unprecedented: Results from Two
Empirical Studies, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/specific[http://perma.cc/4PGNdirection-is-unprecedented-results-from-two-empirical-studies/
DM3L] (archived Sept. 7, 2014) (presenting two multi-year empirical studies on aiding
and abetting incidents and academic scholarship on complicity, and concluding that
"'specific direction' has no basis in customary international law or scholarly thought.");
James G. Stewart, The ICTY Loses Its Way on Complicity - Part 1, OPINIO JURIS (Apr.
3, 2013, 09:00 EDT), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-post-the-icty-loses-its-way(archived Sept. 7, 2014)
on-complicity-part- 1/ [http://perma.cc/CH6H-BLKK]
(describing how the Perigid legal standard is at odds with the views of numerous
experts, including "a dozen of the best criminal theorists in the English-speaking
world").
While an apparent solid majority of experts disagree with the requirement of
"specific direction," certain experts have defended it. See, e.g., Kai Ambos & Ousman
Njikam, Charles Taylor's Criminal Responsibility, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 789, 804-08
(2013) (expressing support for the "specific direction" standard set out in the Perigi6
appellate judgment); Kevin Jon Heller, Why the ICTY's "Specifically Directed"
Requirement Is Justified, OPINIO JURIS (June 2, 2013, 04:00 EDT), http://
opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/why-the-ictys-specifically-directed-requirement-is-justified/
[http://perma.cc/A8PA-W3ZE] (archived Sept. 7, 2014) ("[A]s long as aiding and
abetting's mens rea requires no more than knowledge, the specific-direction
requirement is a necessary and useful element of aiding and abetting's actus reus.").
70-72 (concluding, based
See Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1,
14.
upon a de novo review of the evidence, that "[n]either the findings of the Trial Chamber
nor the evidence on the record" proved a "sufficient link" between General Perigii's
actions and the crimes he was accused of assisting).
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(Republika Srpska), Charles Taylor was accused of buttressing rebel
forces in Sierra Leone's civil war.1 5 But the issues in these two cases
were so closely related that many experts considered Peridid the
death knell of criminal responsibility for the likes of Taylor.' 6 While
Taylor was convicted at trial for having knowingly aided and abetted
atrocities in the Sierra Leone Civil War, he would plausibly have
been acquitted on appeal if the SCSL had not explicitly declined to
follow the legal standard set in Periie.
This Article will accordingly explore the impact that Perigid
might have on international relations if other courts opt to follow this
precedent, such as by considering the political repercussions of their
decisions. The record suggests that several judges at the ICTY were
concerned that convicting individuals like General Perigii could
potentially disrupt international relations by casting too wide a net
for convicting leaders who knowingly facilitate the crimes of a foreign
army by providing substantial operational support. We will therefore
examine whether requiring additional proof that a defendant's
actions were "specifically directed" to assist crimes would be
reasonable under these circumstances or create an unprecedented
hurdle for convicting leaders who enable atrocities by a foreign army.
II. THE

LANDMARK PERIRIC TRIAL

As the highest-ranking military officer in Serbia during most of
the Bosnian War,' 7 General Perii was responsible for managing
Serbia's provision of considerable military assistance to its Bosnian
Serb allies. Given that Slobodan Milogevid died in 2006 while facing
trial, General Perigid's case came closest to determining the
responsibility of Serbian leadership for war crimes. Unlike
defendants in other ICTY aiding and abetting cases, General Perigi6
mainly acted from Belgrade, a relatively distant location from the
crime scenes.
General Perigid was subordinate to the Supreme Defense Council
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), whose most influential
member was Milogevid, then the President of Serbia.' 8 Yugoslavia
15.
See Taylor Appellate Judgment, supra note 2, f 260, 280, 518-21.
16.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Prosecution Motion
for Leave to File Additional Written Submissions Regarding the ICTY Appeals
Judgement in Perigic, 11 2, 7-8 (Mar. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Taylor Motion] (arguing
that the Special Court for Sierra Leone should not follow the precedent set in Perigid
because it deviated from established jurisprudence and reflected errors of reasoning);
Bowcott, supra note 13 (describing the debate spurred by General Perigk's acquittal).
17.
See Perigid Trial Judgment, supra note 1, 1 3. General Perigik was
appointed Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army on August 26, 1993, and served
until November 24, 1998. Id.
205, 962 (discussing the order of subordination within the FRY
18.
See id.
and finding that "Rlogistical assistance to the VRS was regularly discussed and agreed
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was by then a largely Serbian entity due to the secession Of Slovenia,
Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Ethnic strife was especially severe
in Bosnia, which was divided between Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian
Serb, and Bosnian Croat factions. General Perigid was responsible for
overseeing the extensive military assistance provided by the Army of
Yugoslavia (Vojska Jugoslavije or VJ) to the Bosnian Serb military
force, the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske or
VRS).' 9 However, General "Perigid's role went beyond administering
the logistical assistance process," as he "recurrently encouraged the
[Supreme Defense Council] to maintain this assistance."20
Yugoslavia already provided logistical assistance to the Bosnian
Serb army prior to General Periid's appointment, 2 1 yet logistical
assistance became more structured during his tenure.2 2 General
Perigk notably met and conferred with General Mladi6, the Bosnian
Serb military commander, about his army's needs in weaponry.28
General Perigii also strove to regularize the status of over 2,500 VJ
officers fighting in Bosnia under the banner of the VRS, thereby
allowing them to retain their salaries and benefits as VJ members.2 4
These officers included Mladie and several top officers later convicted
of war crimes.25
General Perigi6 was charged with aiding and abetting war
crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the VRS in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica, Bosnia, between 1993 and 1995.26 The Trial
Chamber found that grave crimes had indeed occurred on the
ground-an unsurprising conclusion given that atrocities in the
upon at FRY Supreme Defence Council meetings attended by Perigi6, as well as
Slobodan Milogevid, President of Serbia").
19.
See id. pt. VIB, 1007 (concluding that "Perigid, as Chief of the VJ General
Staff, oversaw the administration of logistical assistance for the military needs of the VRS").
20.
Id. 1 1008.
21.
See id. 1 1595 ("[A]though the VJ was providing logistical assistance to the
VRS even before Perigi became Chief of the VJ General Staff, he helped to efficiently
continue this policy.").
22.
See id. T 948 (finding, for example, that "[iun order to avoid unauthorised
transfers of ammunition and equipment, an agreement was entered into between
Periii and Mladid according to which VRS units would submit logistical assistance
requests to the VRS Main Staff's Logistics Sector, which would review all requests, and
relay them to the VJ General Staff to obtain Perigi's approval").
23.
See, e.g., id.
943-47 (describing how General Perigi held monthly
meetings in Belgrade where Mladi6 "gave presentations explaining the situation in
[Bosnia]" and asked Perigi6 "to assist with the needs of the VRS;" and quoting witness
explaining that "[m]aking the presentation to Perigid was necessary because 'nothing
could have been done without his knowledge. He couldn't have been bypassed."').
24.
See id.
793, 1607-09 (discussing the transfer of Yugoslav Army (VJ)
officers to the VRS and noting that "all of the military personnel serving in the VRS
through the 30th PC (Personnel Centre] remained members of the VJ").
25.
See id. 1 1608-09. Mladi6 was arrested on May 26, 2011, and was being
tried by the Yugoslavia tribunal at the time of writing. See generally Colum Lynch,
Serbia Arrests Ratko Mladic on War Crimes Charges,WASH. POST, May 26, 2011.
26.
In addition, General Perigi6 was charged with failing to prevent or punish
crimes perpetrated by subordinates, although the present Article will not address these
separate allegations. See Perigid Trial Judgment, supra note 1, 11 6-7.
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Bosnian War have been well documented. The VRS conducted a
lengthy campaign of shelling and sniping in Sarajevo causing the
deaths of hundreds of civilians and the wounding of thousands of
others.2 7 Moreover, after the VRS invaded Srebrenica, a Muslim
enclave that the UN had designated as a safe haven for civilians, the
VRS forcibly removed and massacred thousands of Muslim civilians
and war prisoners. 28
While the evidence did not establish whether General Perigid
had condoned the Bosnian Serb army's crimes or intended them to
occur, it unequivocally showed that he willfully buttressed the
Bosnian Serb army throughout the conflict despite being regularly
notified of grave allegations of crimes targeting Bosnian Muslims. 2 9
In particular, he knew of UN Security Council Resolutions and media
reports mentioning regular attacks by Bosnian Serbs on Sarajevo
civilians,3 0 which were a focal point of diplomatic affairs and global
news coverage at the time. At a Supreme Defense Council session on
June 7, 1994, General Perigi notably said that the Yugoslav army
could not dispatch its Muslim military students to the Bosnian Serb
army because "if we send the Muslims there . . . they'll kill them,"31

thereby demonstrating his awareness that the Bosnian Serb army
was inclined to gratuitously attack Muslims. General Perigid was
likewise aware that the international community had taken an
extraordinary step in creating a war crimes tribunal in The Hague to
judge atrocities occurring in Bosnia. For example, on August 30,
1994, he was briefed by Colonel Branko Krga, his chief of intelligence,
about how the international community was highly concerned by "the
issue of human rights" and Serbia's "readiness to cooperate with the
International War Crimes Tribunal."3 2 Nevertheless, General Perigid

27.
See, e.g., id. TT 291, 319-22, 549, 1630 ("Mladid - described by a witness as
the 'strategist' of the siege - stated that he held 'the city in his palm.'. . . No civilian
activity and no area of Sarajevo seemed to be safe from sniping or shelling attacks from
[the Bosnian Serb army].").
28.
See, e.g., id. TT 1526, 1591, 1630 ("[Tlhe attack of Srebrenica involved the
removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population and was followed by the organised
mass execution and burial of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians and/or persons not
taking an active part in hostilities, as well as the commission of other abuses on a very
wide scale.").
29.
See id. T$ 1632-48 (finding that Perikid continued to support the Bosnian
Serb army even though he "knew that his conduct assisted in the commission of [its]
crimes" in Sarajevo and Srebrenica); see also TT 1390-1437 (discussing Perigi's access
to information).
30.
See, e.g., id. TT 1478, 1496-1519 (citing, inter alia, evidence that
"[t]hroughout the war, the FRY Mission to the UN sent numerous diplomatic cables to
the FRY leadership in Belgrade to inform them about discussions held and resolutions
adopted by the [UN Security Council]. Perigid was copied directly on several of those
cables concerning shelling and sniping incidents in Sarajevo, as well as the VRS attack
on Srebrenica.").
31.
Id. T 1459.
32.
Id. 1476.
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kept providing support to the Bosnian Serb army even after learning
of the enormous massacre in Srebrenica in the summer of 1995.33
The Trial Chamber convicted General Periid after finding that
he had knowingly provided practical assistance having a substantial
effect on crimes by the Bosnian Serb army.34 While the Trial
Chamber found General PeriMid guilty of aiding and abetting various
counts of murder, attacks on civilians, persecution, and inhumane
acts in Sarajevo and Srebrenica, it acquitted him of aiding and
abetting the crime of extermination in Srebrenica.35 Extermination,
under the tribunal's statute, "is the act of killing on a large scale."36
(Genocide was not charged in this case.) The evidence at trial showed
that General Periid "knew that it was very probable that the VRS
would forcibly transfer Bosnian Muslims and commit some acts of
mistreatment and killings with discriminatory intent once Srebrenica
had fallen under their control."3 7 Yet, "none of the information
provided to Perigi6 on the VRS's criminal conduct alerted him to the
fact that the VRS intended to commit a crime on the scale of the one
that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995," when approximately 8,000
Muslims were systematically slaughtered.3 8
The verdict of the three-judge Trial Chamber was not
unanimous. Judges Pedro David of Argentina and Michble Picard of
France voted to convict General Perigi6, whereas Judge Bakone
Justice Moloto of South Africa dissented on various factual and legal
grounds. By majority vote, the Trial Chamber sentenced General
Perigid to twenty-seven years in prison. 39
The ICTY Appeals Chamber subsequently acquitted General
Perigi6 by concluding that his assistance to the Bosnian Serb army
was not "specifically directed" to assist crimes. 40 Liu Daqun of China
was the sole member of the five-judge appellate panel to dissent.
Theodor Meron of the United States, Carmel Agius of Malta, Arlette

33.
Id. TT 1544, 1826.
34.
See id.
1597-1602, 1621-23, 1627, 1631, 1649 (concluding, inter alia,
that "Perigid repeatedly exercised his authority to assist the VRS in waging a war that
encompassed systematic criminal actions against Bosnian Muslim civilians as a
military strategy and objective.").
35.
Id.
1636, 1638, 1647-48.
36.
Id. 106 (defining the crime of extermination); see also Updated Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5(b).
37.
Periiid Trial Judgment, supranote 1, 1637.
38.
Id. TT 1640, 1647; see also Dan Bilefsky & Marlise Simons, Netherlands
Held Liable for 300 Deaths in Srebrenica Massacre, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/worldleurope/court-finds-netherlands-responsiblefor-srebrenica-deaths.html [http://perma.cc/HAA8-RAFE] (archived Sept. 13, 2014)
(stating that "roughly 8,000 Muslim men and boys [were] massacred at Srebrenica").
39.
See Periiii Trial Judgment, supra note 1, T 1815-22, 1835-41.
40.
See Perigi6 Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, TT 73-74 (concluding that "it
has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that Perisk carried out 'acts
specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of
[the] [sic] certain specific crime[s]' committed by the VRS.").
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Ramaroson of Madagascar, and Andr6sia Vaz of Senegal were in the
majority. As we will now see, the Appeals Chamber arrived at its
conclusions by disregarding critical evidence and adopting a
questionable interpretation of the law.
III. How THE ICTY APPEALS

CHAMBER SET A TROUBLING PRECEDENT
IN PERIRe

A. Ignoring CriticalEvidence
General PerigiCs acquittal has proven highly controversial, yet
virtually all commentators have solely focused on the legal reasoning
of the ICTY Appeals Chamber while disregarding its factual analysis.
The majority of experts have especially called into question the
Appeals Chamber's decision to require explicit proof that, in aiding
and abetting cases, the defendants' actions were "specifically
directed" to assist crimes. 41 However, commentators have seldom
remarked upon how the Appeals Chamber ignored critical factual
evidence. This oversight is striking given the historical significance of
the Perigid case. The case essentially presented an issue of first
impression-whether a military or political leader may be convicted
for knowingly facilitating the crimes of another state's army. In
addition, the case addressed issues of considerable importance in the
Bosnian War, arguably the worst conflict to affect Europe since World
War II.
In particular, the Appeals Chamber deemed that no "link"
existed between General Perigid's actions and the Bosnian Serb
army's crimes since he had only provided general military
assistance. 42 Given the alleged absence of such a "link," the Appeals
Chamber implied that the Trial Chamber had adopted a strict
liability standard whereby any assistance from one army to another
would trigger liability if the recipient army committed crimes. 43 In
reality, the Trial Chamber had found that a significant link existed
between General Perigi6's actions and the Bosnian Serb army's
crimes in light of two key factors.
Firstly, extensive evidence showed that the beleaguered Bosnian
Serb military force heavily depended on aid from Serbia to function as
an army and conduct its operations, as it had limited weaponry,
qualified personnel, and financial resources. 44 General Perigid

41.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42.
Peri~k Appellate Judgment, supranote 1, 72.
See id. ("[T]he Appeals Chamber considers that assistance from one army to
43.
another army's war efforts is insufficient, in itself, to trigger individual criminal
liability for individual aid providers absent proof that the relevant assistance was
specifically directed towards criminal activities.").
See Perigik Trial Judgment, supra note 1, TT 1597-1602, 1621.
44.
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managed this support and recurrently urged the Supreme Defense
Council to maintain it. 45 "[W]e can't leave them to their own devices,"
he underlined. 4 6 Other influential figures agreed that the Bosnian
Serb army significantly relied on Serbian aid to conduct its
operations. Slobodan Milogevid stressed that "everything that has
been made [in Bosnia] was made thanks to Serbia and the army." 47
Ratko Mladid, the Commander of the Bosnian Serb army, admitted
that "we would not be able to live" without Serbian support. 48
Radovan Karadii, the Bosnian Serb political leader, concurred that
"nothing would happen without Serbia. We do not have those
resources and we would not be able to fight."49 Moreover, the Bosnian
Serb army's reports described its material and financial predicament
in the following terms: "grave," "catastrophic," "alarming," and
"extremely poor."5 0 Dependence on Serbian military aid "was
exacerbated by" how "the great bulk of military supplies was given
free of charge" and how the Bosnian Serb army "was otherwise
frequently unable to pay whenever payment was demanded."5 1 Yet,
not a single reference to this dependence appears in the appellate
judgment acquitting General Periii
Secondly, conclusive evidence showed that the strategy and
objectives of the Bosnian Serb army encompassed systematic attacks
on Bosnian Muslim civilians as part of an ethnic cleansing plan. 52 It
laid siege to Sarajevo to ultimately separate it into Serb and Muslim
sectors.5 3 Sniping and shelling Sarajevo civilians advanced this
objective by aiming to force Bosnian Muslims to capitulate. 54
"Civilians were targeted during funerals, in ambulances, in hospitals,
on trams, on buses, when driving or cycling, at home, while tending
gardens or fires or clearing rubbish in the city, in gathering points,
such as markets, sports events or while queuing for food and
water."5 5 The shelling of Sarajevo "was indiscriminate and resulted in

45.
See id.
962-74, 1594-96, 1599.
46.
Id. 968.
47.
Id. T 1599.
48.
Id. 1 1598.
49.
Id.
Id. T 1597.
50.
Id.
51.
52.
See, e.g., id. IT 305, 598, 605-07, 1589-91 (describing, inter alia, the
objectives of "Operational Directive 7" issued by Radovan Karadii6 to the VRS and of a
subsequent order entitled "Krivaja 95" issued by the Commander of the Drina Corps (a
VRS unit), both of which encompassed the perpetration of ethnic cleansing of the
Bosnian Muslim population in territory sought by the VRS).
53.
See id. 11 305, 1589 ("One of the six strategic objectives of the Bosnian Serb
leadership was to partition Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim sectors and establish a
separate state authority for each sector.").
54.
See id. TT 305, 1589-90 (explaining that the VRS sniping and shelling of
Sarajevo civilians was "designed to intimidate the population of Sarajevo and break its
morale and spirit, as well as to destabilise [Bosnia and Herzegovina] as a country.").
Id. $ 320.
55.
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mostly civilian victims." 56 The Bosnian Serb army fired over one
hundred shells on Sarajevo on a daily basis-a total of over two
million shells throughout the siege.57 "Shelling targets generally had
no clear military value and included apartment blocks, schools,
hospitals, food queues and historical buildings," the Trial Chamber
underlined.5 8 By the same token, "frequent and indiscriminate"
sniper attacks led to heavy civilian casualties on the streets of
Sarajevo.5 9 Overall, "[tihe Sarajevo State Hospital received more than
100 patients every day" throughout the siege, "and the ratio of
civilian to military patients was about 4:1."eo
Eliminating the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica was another major
part of the Bosnian Serb leadership's ethnic cleansing plan.61 On
March 8, 1995, Radovan Karadiid illustratively issued a directive
outlining the Bosnian Serb army's strategic objectives, which entailed
"creat[ing] an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of
further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and 2epa."62
The Bosnian Serb army ultimately tried to eliminate the Muslim
enclave of Srebrenica by removing or killing its population, which led
to mass atrocities, including the execution of thousands of Muslims. 63
In sum, the Trial Chamber found that a consequential link
existed between General Perigid's actions and the alleged crimes since
the Bosnian Serb army heavily depended on operational support to
commit its crimes. In its view, it was no defense for General Perigid to
argue that he merely provided general military assistance since
warfare by the Bosnian Serb army encompassed grave crimes licensed
by its leaders, including top officers on Serbia's payroll. 64

56.
57.

Id. 326.
See id. T 323.

Id. 326 (footnotes omitted).
58.
59.
See id. T 330 (noting "that between September 1992 and August 1994,
civilians were shot nearly every day as VRS gunners fired indiscriminately into the
city.").
Id. 320.
60.
61.
See id. $T 598-600, 605-07, 1523, 1591 (noting, inter alia, that the third
strategic goal outlined by Radovan Karadii at the 16th Session of the Assembly of the
Serbian people "related to the areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, its aim being to establish a
corridor in the Drina River valley and eliminate the Drina River as a border between
the Serbian states.").
16.
Id. T 605. Zepa was another Muslim enclave. Id.
62.
See id. TT 607, 1591 (explaining that the Bosnian Serb army aimed to
63.
"reduce the 'safe area' of Srebrenica to its urban centre . . . plung[e] the Bosnian
Muslim population into a humanitarian crisis and ultimately eliminate[e] the enclave,"
which "involved the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population" and "the
organised mass execution and burial of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians").
64.
See id. TT 1588, 1593, 1602 ("[T]he crimes charged in the Indictment were
an integral part of the VRS's war strategy. Hence, the evidence leads the Majority to
the only reasonable conclusion that by providing vital logistical and technical
assistance to the VRS during the war, including to the specific units that perpetrated
the crimes, Perigid facilitated the commission of those crimes.").
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Yet, the Appeals Chamber examined the Bosnian Serb army's
crimes out of context by disregarding the most critical evidence
adduced at trial. Its judgment acquitting General Perigi6 made
essentially no mention of the Bosnian Serb army's ethnic cleansing
plan or its strategic objectives in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.65 In
particular, the Appeals Chamber stressed that "the Trial Chamber
did not find that all VRS activities in Sarajevo or Srebrenica were
criminal in nature" 66 but that "only certain actions of the VRS in the
context of the operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica" were criminal.67
This euphemistic characterization overlooked several basic facts: (i)
an ethnic cleansing plan was among the Bosnian Serb army's central
objectives in the war; (ii) the siege of Sarajevo and the takeover of
Srebrenica were major operations of this ethnic cleansing plan; (iii)
these operations largely consisted of gratuitous attacks on civilians;
and (iv) these operations resulted in several thousand victims. 68 The
Appeals Chamber's analysis nonetheless suggested that the siege of
Sarajevo and the takeover of Srebrenica were side events that were
not central to the Bosnian Serb army's war plans and the conflict as a
whole.
By intent or design, the omissions of the Appeals Chamber had
profound implications. Once one ignores or overlooks how the crimes
in question were wide scale atrocities licensed by the Bosnian Serb
military leadership, one can come to see them as isolated crimes
perpetrated by rogue soldiers acting independently. Under these
circumstances, it becomes far more doubtful that General Perigid
could be responsible as an aider and abettor. After all, if a few rogue
soldiers murder a limited number of civilians, how could the foreign
military leader who oversaw general operational support be
criminally responsible?
The appended diagram illustrates how crimes perpetrated by
rogue soldiers fall outside of warfare approved by a nation's military
leadership. If the crimes perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb army in
Sarajevo and Srebrenica had fallen in that category, and if they had
occurred on a small scale, General Perigid's responsibility would
arguably have been minimal. However, the diagram pinpoints how
war plans by a nation's military leadership can encompass attacks on
65.
An introductory paragraph in the Appeals Chamber judgment mentioned in
passing that the Trial Chamber made findings regarding the strategy of the Bosnian
Serb army, although no details are provided. See Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra
note 1,
14. This issue was not addressed at all in the section of the appellate
judgment presenting the court's reasoning. The Appeals Chamber only tangentially
alluded to the issue when briefly mentioning "the Trial Chamber's finding that the
VRS's strategy was 'inextricably linked to' crimes against civilians." Id. 1 53.
66.
Id. 53.
67.
Id. (emphasis added).
68.
See, e.g., Perigi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 1,
305, 320, 326, 330, 598600, 605-07, 1523, 1589-91 (documenting evidence regarding key dimensions of the
ethnic cleansing campaign pursued by the Bosnian Serb army).
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civilians. Given that crimes by the Bosnian Serb army fell in that
overlapping category and were of an enormous magnitude, General
Perigi could be held responsible as an aider and abettor.
CRIMES

WARFARE

Attacks on

Ordn aryb battles/
Strikes on lawful targets

civilians
litand ry
leadership

Crimes by rogue soldiers
acting independently

for strategic
or political
reasons

The Appeals Chamber tangentially addressed this issue when it
noted that General Perigid had provided "general assistance which
could be used for both lawful and unlawful activities"169 and argued
that the evidence against Perigid was therefore entirely

"circumstantial."7 0 Yet, even assuming that the case was wholly
circumstantial, one may conclude that the only reasonable inference
was that General Perigid's actions had a "substantial effect" on the
Bosnian Serb army's ethnic cleansing campaign. 7' It is doubtful that
an individual can heavily buttress a dependent and beleaguered army
without having a "substantial effect" on its operations. 72 If attacks on
civilians are a major part of these operations, the person who
orchestrated substantial operational support should be convicted of
aiding and abetting these crimes if he was aware of them.
B. Raising the Legal Standardfor Conviction
The ICTY Appeals Chamber not only ignored critical evidence in
its decision acquitting General Perigid, it also raised the legal
standard to convict top officials of aiding and abetting atrocities by

69.
Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, 1 44.
70.
Id. 1 47.
71.
Under the applicable legal standard, the aider's actions must have a
"substantial effect" on the commission of the crime. Id. 1 26; accord Perigid Trial
Judgment, supra note 1, 126; Taylor Appellate Judgment, supra note 2, 362.
72.
Under ICTY jurisprudence, the prosecution does not have the burden of
proving that the crimes would not have occurred but for the aider's actions. See Perigid
Trial Judgment, supra note 1, 1626 ("The Majority also recalls that there is neither a
requirement of a cause-effect relationship between Perigik's conduct as an aider and
abettor and the commission of the crimes, nor a requirement that his actions served as
a condition precedent to the commission of the crimes, nor a requirement that his
actions have been the cause sine qua non of the crimes.") (footnotes omitted).
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requiring proof that support was "specifically directed" to assist
crimes, especially when the defendant provided support from a
remote location.7 3
Only passing references to the concept of "specific direction" were
previously made in the bulk of the ICTY's aiding and abetting
jurisprudence. The concept remained obscure until the Appeals
Chamber's decision in Perigie. As underlined in Judge. Liu's
dissenting opinion, "specific direction has not been applied in past
cases with any rigor." 74 A concurring opinion by Judge Ramaroson
agreed that "specific direction" was not applied in former cases.7 5 The
majority opinion itself acknowledged that "previous appeal
judgements have not conducted extensive analyses of specific
direction."7 6
The first ICTY appellate judgment where the concept appeared
was Tadie,7 7 which stated:
The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist,
encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific
crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of
civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon
78
the perpetration of the crime.

It is unlikely that the appellate panel in Tadid interpreted the
phrase "specifically directed" in the same way as the distinct
appellate panel in Perigid interpreted it fourteen years later. The
single reference to "specifically directed" acts in Tadie lacked
explanatory analysis.79 References to "specific direction" in
subsequent cases were cursory and often appear to have been simply
copied and pasted from Tadi. Judge Liu's dissent from the Perigid
appellate judgment similarly observed that most cases cited by the
majority "simply restate[d] language from the Tadi6 Appeal
Judgement without expressly applying the specific direction
requirement."80 Judge Ramaroson concurred that most prior cases
reiterated the Tadid language "verbatim" and "never" applied
"specific direction" to the facts of these cases.8 1

73.
See Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. III, TT 42, 73-74.
74.
Id. pt. VIII, T 3 (Liu, J., dissenting).
75.
See id. pt. IX,
3-4 (Ramaroson, J., concurring).
76.
Id. pt. III, T 38.
77.
See id. 26 ("The Appeals Chamber recalls that the first appeal judgement
setting out the parameters of aiding and abetting liability was the Tadi6 Appeal
Judgement, rendered in 1999.").
78.
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, T 229(iii) (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (emphasis added).
79.
See Case Review, supra note 13, at 1852 (arguing that the reference to
"specifically directed" actions in Tadi6 was mere "obiter dictum").
80.
See Periid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. VIII, 1 2 (Liu, J.,
dissenting).
81.
See id. pt. IX, T 4 (Ramaroson, J., concurring).
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One may conclude that the reason why "specific direction" was
barely discussed in prior cases was because it is not an indispensable
element of aiding and abetting. That is indeed what the Appeals
Chamber had held in a precedent, namely Mrkii and Slijvandanin,
where "specific direction" was discussed in somewhat greater detail. 82
The Appeals Chamber dismissed lijvandanin's defense that he
should be acquitted because "specific direction" had not been
proved.8 3 It rejected this rationale and explicitly held that "'specific
direction' is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and
abetting."84 Nevertheless, in Perigi6, the Appeals Chamber argued
that it never really meant what it held in Mrkii and Slijvandanin,
and asserted that "specific direction" is an indispensable element of
aiding and abetting under the tribunal's jurisprudence.8 5 The Appeals
Chamber still conceded that its holding in Mrkii and Slijvaneanin
reflected "ambiguity" about the need to establish "specific direction." 86
Additional ambiguity about the meaning of "specific direction" is
palpable in the Perigid appellate judgment, which not only spawned a
dissenting opinion but concurring opinions by three judges. Judge
Ramaroson's concurrence stressed that "specific direction" has been
miscategorized under actus reus and is best understood as a mens rea
element.8 7 A joint separate opinion by Judges Meron and Agius also
posited that "specific direction" truly is a mens rea concept, yet oddly
maintained that the applicable mens rea for aiding and abetting
remains "knowledge."88 A knowledge standard is actually
incompatible with the much higher specific intent standard implied
by "specific direction." These two judges' positions therefore suggested
an inclination to raise the threshold for conviction, which is precisely
what the majority opinion accomplished.
82.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mrkgi & Slijvaneanin, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A,
Judgement,
159 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009)
[hereinafter Mrkgi and Slijvaneanin Appellate Judgment].
83.
Id.
157, 159.
84.
Id.
159 (emphasis added). This holding was affirmed in a subsequent
case. Prosecutor v. Lukic & Luki6, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Judgement, TT 424-25 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Lukid and Lukid
Appellate Judgment].
85.
See Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. III, TT 32-36 (arguing
that the Appeals Chamber in Mrkgi and lijvaneanin "neither intended nor attempted
a departure from settled precedent" regarding the element of "specific direction").
86.
Id. 36.
87.
See id. pt. IX,
7 (Ramaroson, J., concurring). Unlike the three other
judges in the majority, Judge Ramaroson's decision to acquit General Perigid did not
focus on "specific direction" but on the separate ground that he lacked knowledge that
his comprehensive assistance to the Bosnian Serb army facilitated its crimes. Id. $T 5,
10. Her concurrence featured only a single sentence on this point, and made no
reference to extensive contrary evidence in the trial judgment. Id. 10; see, e.g., Perilic
Trial Judgment, supra note 1, pt. VI.I (describing Perigiis access to information about
crimes by Bosnian Serb troops).
88.
See Perigi6 Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. VII, TT 3-4 (Meron, J. &
Agius, J., joint separate opinion).
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In practice, the interpretation of "specific direction" advanced by
the Appeals Chamber in Perigi6 amounts to de facto specific intent.
Under its narrow and exacting interpretation of the concept, it is
willfully provided substantial
insufficient that General Perigi
assistance specifically to the VRS, an army that systematically
targeted civilians as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign.8 9 It is
equally immaterial that General Perigii willfully sent substantial
assistance to specific VRS units responsible for systematically sniping
and shelling civilians in Sarajevo.90 By the same token, evidence that
General Perigid knew that the VRS perpetrated grave crimes is
insufficient.9 1 According to the Chamber, the element of "specific
direction" was not satisfied because "Peri9id's relevant actions were
intended to aid the VRS's overall war effort" but not its crimes.9 2 This
reference to what General Perigid "intended" confirms that the
Appeals Chamber effectively changed the applicable mens rea from
knowledge to intent for aiding and abetting.
The Appeals Chamber had the discretion to interpret the opaque
and malleable concept of "specific direction" differently, although it
adopted a narrow and exacting standard. As Judge Liu's dissent
pointedly stated, "to insist on such a requirement now effectively
raises the threshold for aiding and abetting liability."93 Furthermore,
the de facto specific intent standard promulgated by the Appeals
Chamber blurs the distinction between aiding and abetting and direct
perpetration. A person who intentionally perpetrates atrocities may
be charged as a principal. Aiding and abetting is technically a lower
degree of criminal responsibility, 94 which is precisely why it hitherto
required a mens rea of knowledge instead of intent. If the Appeals
Chamber deemed that lack of evidence of criminal intent lessened
General Perigiis responsibility, it had the option of reducing his

1466-68, 1588-91, 1639-47
89.
See Perigi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 1,
(finding that systematic crimes against civilians were "inextricably linked to the war
strategy and objectives of the VRS leadership").
90.
See Perigi6 Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. III, 1 66 (holding that
there is no proof of "specific direction" notwithstanding the fact that military assistance
overseen by General Perigid was notably "sent to certain VRS units involved in
1237, 1594, 1602, 1619
committing crimes"); Perigi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 1,
(finding that part of the comprehensive logistical assistance overseen by General
Perigid "was given to VRS units involved in perpetrating the charged crimes: the Drina
Corps, Krajina Corps and [Sarajevo-Romanija Corps]").
1632-40 (analyzing General
91.
See Perigii Trial Judgment, supra note 1,
Perigid's knowledge of the VRS's crimes); see also id. pt. VI.I (describing Perii's access
to information).
92.
See Perigid Appellate Judgment, supranote 1, 60 (emphasis added).
Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. VIII, 3 (Liu, J., dissenting).
93.
See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical
94.
Analysis, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 837, 842-44 & n.54 (2013) (noting that aiding and
abetting is generally considered a lower form of individual criminal responsibility than
direct perpetration under international law, as illustrated by shorter prison sentences).
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twenty-seven year sentence accordingly rather than raising the
requisite level of proof.
The Appeals Chamber's holding not only strayed from its own
jurisprudence, but from customary international law.95 For example,
in the aftermath of World War II, a British military court in
Hamburg convicted two German industrialists for supplying large
quantities of Zyklon B-a gas designed to kill vermin-to the Nazi
S.S. even though the industrialists "knew that the gas was to be used
for the purpose of killing human beings."96 Similarly, the Nuremberg
Military Tribunal held that "[o]ne who knowingly by his influence and
money contributes to the support [of atrocities against Jews] must,
under settled legal principles, be deemed to be, if not a principal,
certainly an accessory to such crimes."9 7 David J. Scheffer, a
reputable expert who formerly served as U.S. Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues, has underlined that "[c]ustomary
international law applies the knowledge standard for aiding and
abetting as a mode of participation."98
In light of the influential nature of the Yugoslavia tribunal's
precedents, the newfound standard advanced by its Appeals Chamber
in Perigid alarmed numerous experts in international criminal law.99
A different panel of ICTY appellate judges ultimately chose to
emphatically reverse the Perigid legal standard when issuing their
judgment in the Sainovi6 case, which held that Perifi6 had been
wrongly decided and should be "unequivocally reject[ed]" as a
precedent. 00 It is rather extraordinary for an appellate court to
reverse itself less than a year after issuing a major decision, although
this turn of events is partly explainable by the fact that ICTY
appellate panels can vary from case to case. The only two judges from
the Perigid appellate panel also on the bench in Sainovi6 were Judges
Liu and Ramaroson.
The Sainovi6 panel determined that Perigid had raised the
standard for conviction by requiring proof of "specific direction." At

95.
The ICTY appellate panel in 8ainovi6 found that "specific direction" is not a
requisite element of aiding and abetting under customary international law. See, e.g.,
Sainovi6 Appellate Judgment, supra note 10, TT 1626-42, 1649-50; Taylor Appellate
Judgment, supra note 2,
417-37, 474-76 (reaching the same conclusion). By way of
further illustration, an empirical study indicates that there is no precedent for "specific
direction" being an indispensable element of aiding and abetting in international
criminal law. See Stewart, "Specific Direction,"supra note 13.
96.
U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 101-02 (1947) (emphasis added).
97.
United States v. Flick, in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1217 (1952) (emphasis added).
98.
Supplemental Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern
University School of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 33, Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (emphasis added).
99.
See generally supra note 13 and accompanying text.
100.
Sainovid Appellate Judgment, supra note 10, 1 1621, 1649-50.
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the outset, it emphasized that Peridid's reliance on the reference to
"specific direction" in the Tadi6 precedent was misplaced since that
case "focused on [Joint Criminal Enterprise] liability" and "does not
purport to be a comprehensive statement of aiding and abetting
liability."101 The Sainovi6 panel's review of ICTY jurisprudence
confirmed that proof of "specific direction" had never been demanded
before the Perigid appellate judgmentl 02 and that such a requirement
had actually been dismissed in two prior cases. 103 The §ainovie
panel's supplementary review of customary international law
likewise led to the conclusion that "specific direction" is not a binding
element of aiding and abetting.104
The Sainovi6 decision came on the heels of the SCSL decision in
the case of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian President. The
prosecution at that court had predictably urged its appellate division
to disregard the Perigi6 holding, which could have served as a
precedent to overturn Taylor's trial conviction for aiding and abetting
atrocities by rebel forces in the Sierra Leone Civil War. 05 The
appellate division of the SCSL eventually decided that Perigid was
only an internal precedent for the Yugoslavia tribunal 06 and declined
to follow its standard on "specific direction," thereby affirming
Taylor's conviction. 07 The SCSL held that Perigid omitted "any
discussion of customary international law" 0 8 and introduced
questionable "novel elements in its articulation of specific
direction." 0 9

101.
Id. 1 1623.
102.
See id. 1 1625.
103.
Id.
1618-21 (citing Mrki6i and Slijvaneanin Appellate Judgment, 159;
Lukk and Lukik Appellate Judgment, 424).
104.
See id. T$ 1626, 1649 (holding that 'specific direction' is not an element of
aiding and abetting liability under customary international law").
105.
See Taylor Motion, supra note 16, TT 2, 7-23 (arguing that the ICTY
Appeals Chamber's holding in Peridi6 deviated from established jurisprudence,
disregarded customary international law, and reflected errors of reasoning).
106.
See Taylor Appellate Judgment, supra note 2, 1 476.
Id.
472-81, 486, 708.
107.
Id. 476.
108.
480. Kevin Jon Heller has argued that it is incorrect to focus on
109.
Id.
whether "specific direction" has a basis under customary international law. See Kevin
Jon Heller, The SCSL's Incoherent-and Selective-Analysis of Custom, OPINIO JURIS
(Sept. 27, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/27/scsls-incoherent-selective-analysiscustom/ [http://perma.cc/38QD-XDFA] (archived Aug. 30, 2014). In Heller's view,
customary international law is only relevant to decisions that expand criminal
responsibility because custom ensures that such decisions will not run afoul of the
legality principle (nullum crimen sine lege), which provides that people cannot be
convicted for conduct that was not criminalized by law at the time of commission. To
Heller, customary international law enables ICTY judges to narrow criminal
responsibility in any way they wish, such as by imposing a requirement of "specific
direction." Heller adds that this does not signify that requiring proof of "specific
direction" is reasonable per se but that customary international law is irrelevant in this
situation. Heller's argument is undoubtedly thoughtful, although it seems to represent
a minority position among scholars. For instance, Manuel Ventura, the Director of the
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Had the SCSL followed the precedent set in Perigi6, it would
plausibly have acquitted Taylor. Indeed, under the Perigid standard,
it would be nearly impossible to convict a top military or political
official of knowingly facilitating mass atrocities from a remote
location. Perigid held that "specific direction," namely a higher degree
of proof, is especially required when an accused was remotely located
from the scene of a crime. 110 The Perigi6 panel argued that the reason
why "specific direction" was hardly discussed in prior ICTY aiding
and abetting cases was because they involved acts "not remote from"
the principal perpetrators' crimes.11 1 In its view, "specific direction"
was "self-evident" and "demonstrated implicitly" in these cases
because the aider and abettor was "physically present during the
perpetration or commission of crimes committed by principal
perpetrators." 112 Conversely, the Appeals Chamber required explicit
proof of "specific direction" in General Perigi's case because he
mainly operated from Belgrade while the crimes occurred in Bosnia.
By the same token, Taylor mainly operated from a location remote
from the crime scenes in Sierra Leone." 3
The SCSL affirmed Taylor's conviction partly by concluding that
whether a defendant aided and abetted crimes from a remote location
is essentially irrelevant and that proof of "specific direction" is not
needed under these circumstances.11 4 The SCSL added that "the
requirement that the accused's acts and conduct have a substantial
effect on the commission of the crime ensures that there is a sufficient
causal link between the accused and the commission of the crime."115
The SCSL thus distanced itself from the ICTY Appeals Chamber's
Peace and Justice Initiative, has suggested that Heller's position could give ICTY
judges the discretion to improperly narrow criminal responsibility as they
idiosyncratically see fit, regardless of customary international law. Manuel Ventura,
Thoughts on Kevin Jon Heller's Two Thoughts of my Critique of Specific Direction,
SPREADING THE JAM (International Law Blog) (Jan. 20, 2014), http://dovjacobs.com/
2014/01/20/guest-post-thoughts-on-kevin-jon-hellers-two-thoughts-of-my-critique-ofspecific-direction/ [http://perma.cc/ZUJ8-6W5L] (archived Aug. 30, 2014). As we saw
above, multiple other experts have concluded that customary international law is
relevant to whether judges should demand proof of "specific direction." See generally
supra note 13 and accompanying text. That was also the conclusion of the appellate
judges in the Taylor and Sainovi6 cases. See Taylor Appellate Judgment, supra note 2,
1 476; Sainovk Appellate Judgment, supra note 10, 1 1618-21, 1649-50.
110.
See Perigii6 Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, TT 38-39 (stating, inter alia,
that "[w]here an accused aider and abettor is remote from relevant crimes, evidence
proving other elements of aiding and abetting may not be sufficient to prove specific
direction[]" and that "[i]n such circumstances ... explicit consideration of specific
direction is required").
111.
Id. 1 38.
112.
Id.
113.
See Taylor Appellate Judgment, supranote 2, T 540.
114.
See id. $1 478-80 (emphasizing that "specific direction" is not a requisite
element of aiding and abetting and rejecting "the PerigiA Appeals Chamber's treatment
of the accused's physical proximity to the crime as a decisive consideration
distinguishing between culpable and innocent conduct" in aiding and abetting cases).
115.
Id. 480 (emphasis added).
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decision in Perigi6, which had insisted that no "link" could be
established between remote assistance and crimes absent proof of
"specific direction." 116
Among numerous other sources, the ICTY Appeals Chamber's
holding in Sainovid cited the Taylor judgment in its decision
reversing the Perigid standard.117 Yet, the fluctuating nature of
appellate panels at the ICTY suggests that its Appeals Chamber
might someday revisit the issue and reinstitute the Peridid standard.
Other international courts might ultimately opt to follow Perigil as
well. Because it is too early to tell if Perigid will become a defunct
precedent or eventually gain traction, we will now examine the
potential impact of the Perigi6 legal standard if other courts adopt it.
C. Would the Perigid StandardFoster Impunity?
As we have seen, the ICTY Appeals Chamber's decision in Perigi6
ignored critical factual evidence and raised the legal threshold to
convict top officials of facilitating atrocities from a remote location.
However, the most remarkable aspect of this precedent may be the
conclusions reached by the court when combining both its factual and
legal analyses.
The Appeals Chamber advanced a two-pronged standard to
assess whether General Perigi6's assistance to the Bosnian Serb army
was "specifically directed" to facilitate crimes.i1s Under its rationale,
General Perigi6 would have been properly convicted if either one of
these two standards had been satisfied.
Firstly, the Appeals Chamber examined whether the Bosnian
Serb army was "an organisation whose sole and exclusive purpose
was the commission of crimes."1 19 The Appeals Chamber predictably
concluded that the VRS did not fit this definition.120 This newfound
standard would be nearly impossible to prove because virtually no
national or pseudo-national military force would fall under that
exceedingly narrow definition. Not even Hitler's Nazi army during
World War II could be described as "an organisation whose sole and
exclusive purpose was the commission of crimes." That is because
warfare is not a crime per se under international criminal law.
Besides the atrocities the Nazis perpetrated against Jews and other

116.
See Perigii Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, TT 37-38 (arguing that the
lack of analysis of "specific direction" in prior cases may be explained by the fact that
they concerned acts in "proximity" to the crime scenes).
117.
See Sainovi6 Appellate Judgment, supra note 10, 1 1649 (citing Taylor
Appellate Judgment, TT 436, 471-81) (holding "that 'specific direction' is not an
element of aiding and abetting liability under customary international law").
118.
See Perigid Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. III, TT 52-54.
Id. IT 52-53.
119.
120.
Id. T 53 (holding that "the VRS was not an organisation whose acts were
criminal per se").
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victims, they also fought battles against the Allies that were not
technically illegal. By the same token, the Bosnian Serb army was a
pseudo-national military force that engaged in ordinary battles
besides committing regular attacks on civilians. To overlook its
atrocities on the ground that not every single one of its operations
was criminal reflected a remarkable absence of discernment by the
Appeals Chamber.
Secondly, the Appeals Chamber assessed whether the Supreme
Defense Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had a "policy of
assisting VRS crimes."121 The Appeals Chamber determined that no
evidence indicates the existence of such a policy.1 22 This reasoning
ignored that the SDC did provide practical assistance enabling the
VRS's crimes, notwithstanding the lack of an official policy to that
effect. Absent proof of intent, this requirement cannot be satisfied
regardless of the magnitude of the aid provided and the knowledge
that the recipient army commits extremely grave crimes.
This peculiar rationale not only led to General Perigii's acquittal
but also could lead to the acquittal of people responsible for
facilitating worse atrocities. Let us consider the following theoretical
example to illustrate the implications of this development in
international criminal law. Imagine that the Nazi army under
Hitler's totalitarian rule had depended on comprehensive logistical
assistance from Country X to function as a military force and commit
mass atrocities in the process. The officials of Country X responsible
for orchestrating that logistical assistance would probably be
acquitted under the Peridi6 standard regardless of their knowledge of
the Nazis' atrocities. Firstly, the officials of Country X could
convincingly argue that the Nazi army was not "an organisation
whose sole and exclusive purpose was the commission of crimes."123
Secondly, the officials of Country X could plausibly argue that they
did not have an official policy of assisting Nazi crimes. On that basis,
they would be acquitted on the ground that their assistance was not
"specifically directed" to assist Nazi crimes. It would be insufficient to
prove that they gave substantial aid to the Nazi army in full
knowledge of its systematic attacks on civilians.
To insist upon a higher degree of proof in cases where an accused
is remotely located, as the ICTY Appeals Chamber did in Perigi6,
comes across as a peculiar rationale at the dawn of the twenty-first
century. The world has never been smaller due to the advent of
modern technology, which has made it possible for information to flow
freely from one side of the globe to the other. Even in pre-modern

121.
Id. 11 52, 54-55.
122.
See id.
52, 54-55, 58 (noting that the Trial Chamber did not identify
evidence that the Yugoslav Supreme Defense Council had the policy of specifically
directing aid toward VRS criminal activities).
123.
Id. 52.
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times, military lines of communication were well developed and
enabled high-ranking officials to commit crimes without being near
the scene. To elevate an accused's remote geographic location to an
effective defense to a charge of aiding and abetting, unless a higher
degree of proof is met, would undoubtedly undermine efforts to
prosecute military or political leaders responsible for knowingly
facilitating mass atrocities.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Certain voices have alleged that political pressure from the
United States and other powers led the ICTY Appeals Chamber to
adopt a quasi-unattainable threshold for convicting political and
military leaders of aiding and abetting crimes in Perigi6.124 However,
"extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence," as Carl Sagan,
the late astronomer, once said.125 No proof has been advanced to
support these extraordinary allegations against the fundamental
integrity of the tribunal and its judges.
The logical principle known as Occam's razor posits that between
two competing theories the simplest explanation is usually the most
accurate.1 26 By this standard, it is more likely that the Appeals
Chamber's decision in Perigi6 reflects its judges' own views rather
than covert directives from higher powers. While important political
interests are obviously at stake in international criminal law, that
does not signify that judges are merely puppets responding to orders
as conspiracy theorists claim.
The decisive role of judges serving on international criminal
courts is often overlooked. Tellingly, academics and journalists have
not studied the individual judicial philosophies of the various judges
on international courts in remotely the same detail as, say, the
judicial philosophies of each of the nine Justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court. Overlooking the individual judicial philosophies of

124.
See generally Marlise Simons, Judge at War Crimes Tribunal Faults
Acquittal of Serb and Croat Commanders, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/worldleurope/hague-judge-faults-acquittals-of-serband-croat-commanders.htnl?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/HA6Z-29MY] (archived
Sept. 13, 2014) (noting that certain experts reckon that recent ICTY rulings sent a
message to potential war criminals that "they do not need to be as frightened of
international justice as they might have been four or five years ago").
125.
Lawrence M. Krauss, Pope John Paul II and the Trouble with Miracles,
L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/07/opinion/la-oe-krausspope-miracle-sainthood-20130708 [http://perma.cc/AM7Y-TB35] (archived Sept. 13,
2014).
126.
See Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam's
Razor: A Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REv. 727, 729 (2004)
(describing how under Occam's razor "the most simple explanation is the one most
likely to be correct").
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international judges helps foster conspiracy theories whereby higher
powers are believed to simply dictate the outcomes of cases.
Conspiracy theories are less common when it comes to the U.S.
Supreme Court partly because each Justice is understood to have his
or her own judicial philosophy.
No evidence of political pressure has been advanced in Peridi6,
although the record suggests that various judges were mindful that
the verdict reached in this case would set an important precedent for
future conflicts. That was not an improper consideration per se, as the
potential repercussions of a legal precedent are arguably among the
relevant factors that judges may take into account in their decisionmaking process in any given case. The significant implications of the
Perigi6 case were apparent in the Appeals Chamber's judgment,
which offered an atypical disclaimer by stating that General Periid's
acquittal "should in no way be interpreted as enabling military
leaders to deflect criminal liability by subcontracting the commission
of criminal acts."127
During oral arguments before the Appeals Chamber, Judge
Meron asked a related question to the appellate prosecutor, Barbara
Goy:
Judge Meron: Now, assume that [Country A supplies] the entire
military aid to a warring party in the neighbouring country B [where]
there is a war going on and the recipient engages both in lawful
military activities but also in large-scale shelling of civilian towns.
Would without more the Chief of Staff of country A be criminally liable?
Ms. Goy:

The answer to the question depends on whether all the

requirements of aiding and abetting are met . . . The question is then

how much did the Chief of Staff know when providingJudge Meron: Assume it is known but nothing more than known.
Ms. Goy: [I]f the Chief of Staff is aware of both, that there is not only
a small or remote risk that crimes will be committed, but there is the
awareness of a probability of crimes, and he is aware that the
assistance provided will probably be used for the commission of these
crimes, then from our point of view the requirements of aiding and
abetting are fulfilled.
Judge Meron: Thank you.128

While these questions raised hypotheticals, one possible
interpretation is that they reflected concern that knowledge would be
too low a standard to convict someone of aiding and abetting under
these circumstances. In particular, an objective observer may infer
127. See Perigii Appellate Judgment, supra note 1, pt. III, 1f 72 (adding that, "[i]f
an ostensibly independent military group is proven to be under control of officers in
another military group, the latter can still be held responsible for crimes committed by
[its] puppet forces").
128. Transcript of Appeals Hearing at 62-63, Perigid Appellate Judgment (Oct.
30, 2012), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/trans/en/121030ED.htm
[http://perma.cc/WW8E-BPW7] (archived Aug. 31, 2014).
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that the remarks "without more" and "known but nothing more than
known" implied that a higher level of proof might be preferable,
namely intent, as convicting the likes of General Perigid could disrupt
international relations by casting too wide a net for aiding and
abetting the crimes of another state's army.129
A similar concern was conveyed more straightforwardly in Judge
Moloto's dissenting opinion at trial, which argued that General
Perigi6's conviction would have problematic implications for
international relations:
[O]ne cannot simply ignore the reality that relations between states are
often reinforced by the provision of significant military aid. Many
foreign armies are dependent, to various degrees, upon such assistance
to function. In this context, I am mindful that in many conflict zones
around the world, the provision of military aid is aimed at supporting
mutual interests such as the deterrence of war, the promotion of
regional and global peace, stability and prosperity and other objectives.
If we are to accept the Majority's conclusion based solely on the finding
of dependence, as it is in casu, without requiring that such assistance
be specifically directed to the assistance of crimes, then all military and
political leaders, who on the basis of circumstantial evidence are found
to provide logistical assistance to a foreign army dependent on such
assistance, can meet the objective element of aiding and abetting. 130

Judge Moloto may deserve credit for being the only judge, at
either the trial or appellate stage, to have explicitly addressed the
potential impact of the Perigi6 case on future conflicts. Even though
"the finding of dependence" was not the sole basis for convicting
General Perigid, as Judge Moloto affirmed, he raised a key question:
Would General Perigid's conviction have created an overly broad
standard for aiding and abetting?
During the trial's closing arguments, Judge Moloto asked Mark
Harmon, a lead prosecutor, questions about whether top officials from
America and its NATO allies could be held responsible for crimes by
U.S. troops in Afghanistan under the prosecution's theory in Perigid:
Judge Moloto: Let me paint you an analogous scenario and get your
comment on it. A war began in Afghanistan in 2001 and it is generally
known that there are allegations of crime having been committed at
least since 2002 to date. Does that make the commanders of the various
NATO armies that are jointly participating in that war guilty of the
crimes that are alleged to have been committed and are still being
committed, like detentions in Guantanamo, in Bagram, in Kabul and
all these places?

129.
Id. As noted above, the Appeals Chamber suggested that the Trial
Chamber had essentially adopted a strict liability standard in convicting General
Perigid. See Perigi6 Appellate Judgment, supra note 1,
70-72 (holding that no "link"
existed between General Perigi's actions and the crimes he was accused of assisting;
and that "assistance from one army to another army's war efforts is insufficient, in
itself, to trigger individual criminal liability").
130.
Perigi6 Trial Judgment, supra note 1, pt. XII, $ 32-33 (Moloto, J.,
dissenting in part).
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No, no. It's a legal question.

Mr. Harmon:
I would like to answer your question. The objectives, as
I understand, of the NATO forces isn't to ethnically cleanse parts of
Afghanistan. It is to be engaged in a military campaign against the
Taliban. It isJudge Moloto: Mr. Perisic is not charged with ethnically cleansing. He
is charged with murders ...
Mr. Harmon:
Your Honour, he is charged in count in -- in respect of
the crimes in Srebrenica he is charged with inflicting inhumane acts
one of which is the forcible transfer of the population from Srebrenica.
That is, in our view and our respectful submission, forcibly transferring
25 to 35,000 people out of an area where they were living is ethnic
cleansing.
Judge Moloto: Okay. I concede that, but still my question still stands.
. . on the analogy that I've drawn because all the other commanders of
the NATO nations that are involved in Afghanistan are aware of the
kind of crimes that have been committed there and are still continuing
with that war. It's not a political question, it's an analogous situation to
this one.
Mr. Harmon:
[W]here I make my distinction is the purpose in
objectives. The objectives of Bosnian Serbs, in part from strategic
objective number 1, was to ethnically cleanse...
Judge Moloto: [A]l1 I'm saying is there are also other crimes charged
against the accused in this case which like the murders, you know,
which were committed in combat or while they were there. These are
similar crimes as the crimes that are being committed in the
Afghanistani war.
[C]ommanders of the remaining NATO countries that are participating
in Afghanistan are aware of the fact that crimes have been committed,
crimes against humanity have been committed, and yet those
commanders are still continuing to participate in that war, are they
131
then guilty of those crimes that are being committed?

What is of greater relevance here is the nature of the questioning
rather than the prosecutor's answers, as it reflected the concerns of a
distinguished international judge about the implications that a
conviction in Peridit may have for future cases, including those
concerning major powers. Judge Moloto subsequently asked
additional questions about Afghanistan to Bronagh McKenna, a coprosecutor:
Judge Moloto: Now that you were the one talking about the law,
Madam McKenna, would you please apply that law to the question that
I put to Mr. Harmon about the Afghanistani war.

131.
Transcript of Prosecution Closing Statement at 14657-60, Perigid Trial
Judgment, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/trans/en/110328ED.htm
[http://perma.cc/GUB2-CDMM] (archived Aug. 31, 2014).
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Ms. McKenna: Your Honour, I wouldn't like to go further than what
Mr. Harmon said, other than to say that on the applicable law before
this Tribunal, the jurisprudence provides the mens rea and actus reus
are as I have just set out.
Judge Moloto: But I would like to see how this would operate in the
situation in Afghanistan, because as we have agreed, the situations are
identicall 32 . . . there is substantial provisional arms and ammunition
and soldiers by the various NATO commanders in Afghanistan, crimes
are committed there, they don't have the intention to commit crimes,
they don't supply the assistance with the intention to commit crimes,
but nonetheless crimes are committed, and therefore every commander
should be held responsible for whatever crimes are committed in
Afghanistan, all of them.
Ms. McKenna: Your Honour, I would submit that the underlying
crimes with which Perisic is charged are part of a widespread and
systematic attack against the civilian population or a violation of
the laws and customs of war. Once again, if in hypothetical situationJudge Moloto: I have painted no hypothetical situation. I've given you
a situation that is existing on the ground in Afghanistan. It's not a
33
hypothetical.'

The answers of the two prosecuting attorneys essentially stood
for the proposition that America has not deliberately targeted Afghan
civilians on a wide scale like Bosnian Serb troops did. Murders of
Afghan civilians by U.S. soldiers have indeed been perpetrated by a
few rogue elements, some of whom have faced prosecution.1 34 To be
sure, an appreciable number of Afghan civilians have also died as
"collateral damage" due to negligence or recklessness by U.S. troops
and their leadership. 3 5 While "collateral damage" is undoubtedly a
serious humanitarian problem, it is distinguishable from the actions
of an army that intentionally kills scores of civilians pursuant to an
ethnic cleansing plan, as the Bosnian Serb army did in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica.

132.
In fact, the prosecution disputed Judge Moloto's argument that these two
situations were largely "identical," as the prosecutors argued that, unlike in Bosnia,
alleged crimes by U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan "would not be part of a widespread an
systematic attack against a civilian population" pursuant to an "ethnic cleans[ing]"
campaign. Id. at 14657-59, 14673-74.
133.
Id. at 14673-75.
134.
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Guilty Plea by Sergeant in Killing of Civilians,N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/us/sergeant-robert-balestestimony.html [http://perma.cc/A5LV-BWDN] (archived Sept. 13, 2014) (describing the
court hearing in which Robert Bales, an American Staff Sergeant, pled guilty to
murdering sixteen Afghan civilians).
135.
See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., U.S. Concedes Afghan Attack Mainly Killed
Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/worldlasial
22afghan.html [http://perma.cc/8QS-ZS6J] (archived Sept. 13, 2014) (describing a U.S.
airstrike that killed 13 civilians and 3 suspected Taliban fighters and indicating that
hundreds of civilian deaths have been "attributed to American, NATO and Afghan
forces").
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The thoughtful suggestion behind Judge Moloto's questioning
about Afghanistan apparently was that the tribunal should not create
a strict liability standard whereby any crime committed by any
soldier would entail responsibility by top officials on the ground that
they had facilitated the crime by providing operational support.
However, the now-defunct Perigi6 trial judgment did not create such a
catchall. The Trial Chamber followed established jurisprudence by
requiring proof that the defendant provided substantial assistance to
the principal perpetrators despite knowing of their crimes. Not any
aid and not any crime would satisfy that standard. The aid must have
been influential and international criminal law generally focuses on
the worst atrocities, not isolated acts of wrongdoing. Besides, the
factual circumstances of the Perigid case are not extremely common.
Relatively few armies deliberately kill civilians on a wide scale like
the Bosnian Serb army did in Sarajevo and Srebrenica as part of an
ethnic cleansing campaign.
While murders by rogue U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan are
distinguishable from ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian Serb army,
certain high-ranking American officials have licensed other kinds of
crimes in the "War on Terror." For instance, President George W.
Bush personally authorized the use of torture in terrorism cases. 136 If
the officials of allied countries knowingly facilitated this abuse, such
as by transferring individuals into U.S. custody despite knowing that
they would likely be tortured, they may indeed be held criminally
liable for their assistance. 137
In other words, when national leaders knowingly facilitate grave
crimes by a foreign army, these leaders should be prosecuted
regardless of whether they represent a powerful nation. To disagree
with this proposition may suggest "a fear of too much justice," to

136.

See Scott Shane, U.S. Engaged in Torture After 9/11, Review Concludes,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/us-practicedtorture-after-9-11-nonpartisan-review-concludes.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/
U3XS-2TJ2] (archived Sept. 13, 2014) (stating that "[a] nonpartisan, independent
review of interrogation and detention programs" determined that the United States
resorted to "torture" in interrogations following the 9/11 terrorist attacks); R. Jeffrey
Smith, In New Memoir, Bush Makes Clear He Approved Use of Waterboarding,WASH.
POST, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/03/
AR2010110308082.html [http://perma.cc/87F2-VVTQ] (archived Sept. 13, 2014) (noting
that, in his memoir, Bush stated that he personally approved the use of
waterboarding).
137.
Italy's former military intelligence chief was notably sentenced to ten years
in prison by an Italian court for his complicity with "extraordinary renditions," in
contrast to American officials who never faced prosecution in the United States. See
Gaia Pianigiani, Italy Jails Ex-Officials for Rendition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/worldleurope/former-italian-military-officialssentenced-in-abduction-of-abu-omar.html [http://perma.cc/3ZCM-Z2TB] (archived Sept.
13, 2014).
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borrow words from William Brennan, the late U.S. Supreme Court
38
Justice.

V. CONCLUSION

Evidence introduced during the Perigi6 trial provided a powerful
reminder of the international community's shortcomings in
responding to the carnage in Bosnia. Not only did UN peacekeepers
notoriously fail to prevent mass atrocities from occurring, especially
in Srebrenica--considerable weaponry was also sent across the Serb
border to the Bosnian Serbs by easily evading UN border monitors. 139
Belgrade's substantial military aid to its Bosnian Serb allies
undoubtedly facilitated their criminal operations.
The UN ICTY nonetheless achieved a measure of justice when its
Trial Chamber convicted General Perigid for his role in helping enable
these atrocities. Its Appeals Chamber reversed and set a troubling
precedent by raising the threshold of proof and disregarding the most
critical evidence adduced at trial.
Following his acquittal, General Perigid flew from The Hague
back to Belgrade on a Serbian government plane. He then gave a
press conference where he argued that his acquittal was "a modest
contribution towards removing the anathema from the Serb people
about the alleged violations of the customs of war."1 40 These remarks
must be understood in the context of Serbian public opinion, which
perceives the tribunal in The Hague as an institution biased against
Serbs. But it was General Perigid, not "the Serb people," who had
been convicted at trial. One of the objectives of international criminal
law, at least in principle, is to individualize criminal responsibility
and do away with the notion that entire nations are responsible for
war crimes.

138.
In McCleskey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that statistical proof of
systemic racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty is irrelevant.
A defendant must instead prove intent of racial discrimination in his own case, which
is almost impossible to prove without considering systemic patterns. The majority
expressed concern that accepting proof of systemic racial discrimination in capital
cases would open the door to many other challenges to racial discrimination. Such a
concern evinced "a fear of too much justice," as Justice Brennan famously wrote in his
dissenting opinion. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
604, 608-12, 956139.
See, e.g., Perigid Trial Judgment, supra note 1, pt. V,
61, 1052 (describing the failure of the UN Protection Force to protect Srebrenica
civilians and stop the delivery of logistical assistance from Serbia to the Bosnian Serb
army).
Ex-General Says His Acquittal Was "Contribution to Serbia", B92 MEDIA
140.
(Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?yyry=2013&mm=03&dd=Ol
&navid=84942 [http://perma.cc/U2C5-DRXA] (archived Aug. 31, 2014).
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The evidence at trial did not establish whether General Perigi6
condoned the Bosnian Serb army's crimes or intended them to occur,
although the evidence proved that he kept buttressing that army
despite having notice that it perpetrated extremely serious crimes.
Nevertheless, General Perigid's acquittal and triumphant return to
Belgrade suggested that his actions were not criminal in nature.
War is a recurrent problem and it is doubtful that international
criminal law will be able to preempt hostilities from occurring
altogether. But international criminal law can help develop standards
under which, at a minimum, civilians will not be deliberately targeted
and massacred. However, the standard advanced by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Perigid might provide an incentive for political
and military leaders to close their eyes to criminal ways of warfare.
Under this standard, leaders who buttress an allied army while
condoning its crimes may enjoy impunity. Some would plausibly
rationalize their actions by shrugging their shoulders and thinking
"bad things unfortunately happen in war" or "every side commits
crimes during wartime." Further, national leaders who not only
condone their allies' atrocities but intend them to occur might take
comfort in the fact that it may be virtually impossible to convict them
even of aiding and abetting, which technically implies a lower degree
of criminal responsibility than direct perpetration. That is among the
reasons why the mens rea for aiding and abetting should be simply
knowledge, as opposed to the higher standard of intent typically
required for direct perpetration-a distinction blurred by Perigid.
Thus far, the standard set by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Perigid has been reversed by Sainovi6, where a distinct ICTY
appellate panel emphatically declared that Perigi6 had been wrongly
decided. The ICTY Appeals Chamber may revisit the issue in a future
case. An appeal is notably pending in the case of Jovica Stanigid and
Franko Simatovi6, who were acquitted by an ICTY Trial Chamber of
aiding and abetting charges partly based on the Perigid standard. 141
Stani9ii and Simatovid served in the Serbian State Security Service
and were accused of facilitating crimes by special units targeting nonSerbs in Croatia and Bosnia. 142
The future of Perigid as a precedent may ultimately depend on
whether the permanent International Criminal Court and other
courts decide to follow its rationale. The SCSL declined to do so by
emphasizing that Peridi6 was solely an internal precedent for the
ICTY and by affirming Charles Taylor's conviction for facilitating

See Prosecutor v. Stanigik & Simatovi6, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgment,
141.
Vol. II,
1254, 1260, 2360-63 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 30,
2013) (concluding that the accused's assistance was not specifically directed toward the
commission of a crime).
142.
See id. Vol. I, 11 1-6 (explaining the charges and allegations against
Stanigik and Simatovi).
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mass atrocities absent proof of "specific direction."143 The most
remarkable aspect of this landmark decision may have been a
concurrence by Judge Shireen Avis Fisher of the United States, who
dismissed Taylor's claim that he should have been acquitted since the
leaders of influential nations engage in similar conduct. "[S]uggesting
that the Judges of this Court would be open to the argument that we
should change the law or fashion our decisions in the interests of
officials of States that provide support for this or any international
criminal court is an affront to international criminal law and the
judges who serve it," Judge Fisher underscored.1 44
While judges at both the ICTY and SCSL have struck a blow to
Perigi6, other judges might rule differently by weighing the political
implications of their decisions. If courts ultimately decide to treat
Perigi6 as a valid precedent, it might be due to a willingness to raise
the threshold of proof so as not to disrupt international relations by
casting too wide a net for convicting leaders who facilitate crimes by a
foreign army. Such a consideration would particularly protect leaders
of powerful states, which are more likely to have the means to provide
substantial assistance to foreign armies.
"A fear of too much justice" 145 is palpable behind concern that
legal standards crafted by international courts might someday serve
as precedents to challenge disturbing aspects of international
relations and convict officials from major powers. The rapidly growing
field of international criminal law will lack credibility unless it rejects
the notion that knowingly facilitating atrocities is not a crime.

143.
Taylor Appellate Judgment, supra note 2, 1 476.
144.
Id.
717 (Fisher, J. concurring). Judge Renate Winter of Austria joined
Judge Fisher's concurrence. Id. T 721.
145.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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